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STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal is taken from the denial of the defendants
Motion to Suppress after a hearing in the Third Circuit Court, Sandy
City Department, on January 22, 1990, the Honorable Roger A.
Livingston presiding.

On October 21, 1989, Bryan K. Small was

arrested on the charges of Theft and Vehicle Burglary.

On March 26,

1990, Small was convicted of the charges following a trial to the
bench.
On May 21, 1990, Judge Livingston sentenced Small on Count
I to pay a $400.00 fine, and 90 days jail suspended upon 18 months
probation to the Court, 48 hours community service, $200.00 attorney
fee and completion of a course at Western Corrections.

On Count II,

Judge Livingston sentenced Small to 90 days jail, suspended upon 18
months probation to the Court under the same conditions.
This appeal was filed on June 13, 1990. No other prior or
related appeals have been filed.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990), whereby a defendant in
a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment in a Circuit Court.

- 1 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on October 21, 1989, the
defendant, Bryan K. Small, walked out of the Santa Fe Apartments
complex (6936 South 1570 East) and continued walking on Fort Union
Boulevard.

(Transcript —

hereinafter "T" —

at 12-13).

Small is a

black man. (T: 31). Small had been visiting friends who reside at
the Santa Fe Apartments and was leaving.

(T: 14).

Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Hudson was patrolling the
area in his patrol car at that time and observed Small walking out
of the apartment complex. (T: 13). Deputy Hudson did not know Small
and had no knowledge of any criminal activity having recently
occurred in the area. (T: 31; 33; 37). Deputy Hudson did not
believe that Small was trying to hide from him nor did he believe
that Small was committing any crime. (T: 32). Nevertheless, Deputy
Hudson considered Small suspicious because of the lateness of the
hour, the high crime rate in the area and because Small exited the
apartment complex on "a walkway between two entrances, a pathway
that is not a normal pathway for someone to come out next to an
apartment building." (T: 13; 24; 32).
Based on these suspicions, Deputy Hudson made a U-turn with
his patrol car on Fort Union Boulevard and stopped Small who was
walking on the sidewalk.

(T: 29). Deputy Hudson asked Small to

speak to him and Small turned around and walked back to Deputy
Hudson's patrol car.

(T: 34). Deputy Hudson asked Small to remain
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there and demanded Smalls name, date of birth, address and an
explanation of his actions at that time and place.

(T: 34-35).

Small gave Deputy Hudson his name and an explanation of his
actions.

Small was in possession of picture I.D., but because Small

did not have a drivers license in his possession, Deputy Hudson ran
a warrants and license check.

(T: 14; 27). Deputy Hudson was then

informed by his radio dispatcher that there were three outstanding
warrants against Small.

(T: 15). Deputy Hudson then placed Small

under arrest for the warrants.

(T: 17).

Sometime after 4:00 a.m. Salt Lake County Deputy Fontaine
was dispatched to the Santa Fe Apartments to investigate a reported
vehicle burglary.

(T: 46). During the course of his investigation,

Deputy Fontaine heard over the dispatch radio in his patrol car that
Deputy Hudson had stopped and arrested someone in the vicinity who
matched a description of someone seen near the burglarized vehicle.
(T: 47-48).

Deputy Fontaine then instructed Deputy Hudson to hold

Small at the scene of the stop on Fort Union Boulevard until he
arrived with the reporting witness.

(T: 48). Small remained inside

Deputy Hudson's patrol car and was identified by the witness
transported there by Deputy Fontaine.

(T: 50). Small was then

transported to the Salt Lake County Jail.

(T: 50).

Deputy Fontaine continued the investigation of the reported
vehicle burglary.

Small was asked by Deputy Hudson where his car

was parked, and Deputy Fontaine located a vehicle registered to
Small in the vicinity.

(T: 50). Deputy Fontaine investigated the
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vehicle and based on evidence located there proceeded to the Salt
Lake County Jail and charged Small with Theft and Vehicle
Burglary.1

(T: 50).

1

Property taken from the burglarized vehicle was
identified and seized from Small's vehicle at this time. The items
seized were introduced by the State as evidence at trial held on
March 26, 1990.
- 4 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Small contends on appeal that Sheriffs deputies lacked
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small to justify the
stop and detention of Small on Fort Union Boulevard.

Small further

contends that because the stop was unjustified, the trial court
erred in denying Small's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained
against him as a result of the stop.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEPUTY HUDSON LACKED REASONABLE
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO
JUSTIFY THE STOP OF SMALL
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . ." The Utah Constitution, in Article I, §14,
provides this same guarantee with essentially the same language.
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990) provides:
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect - Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
Courts look to the facts of each case to determine whether the
constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" exists to justify
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the stop and detention of an individual.

State v, Sierra, 754 P. 2d

972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted).
The constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure apply to investigatory stops that fall short of official
arrest.

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987)•

A

seizure occurs when a reasonable person remains, not in the spirit
of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he
believes he is not free to leave based on the totality of
circumstances, including any showing of force or authority by the
officer.

:id. In the case at bar, the stop and detention of Small

prior to his arrest by Deputy Hudson constitutes a seizure because
Small could not reasonably have believed under the circumstances
that he was free to ignore Deputy Hudson or leave.
First, Deputy Hudson visibly altered his course of travel
by making a U-turn in his patrol car to stop Small.

Deputy Hudson

was not involved in an ongoing criminal investigation, had no
reports of criminal activity at that time and had never met Small.
Thus, by his acts, Deputy Hudson initiated a criminal investigation
of Small.

Cf., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (Officer

did not "stop" bystanders by speaking to them during the course of
an ongoing burglary investigation).
Second, Deputy Hudson told Small to stop, reverse
direction, come back to his patrol car and present identification,
his name, date of birth, address and an explanation of his actions.
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Deputy Hudson did not tell Small he was free to leave and, on
cross-examination, admitted that he expected Small to stay and talk
to him.

(T: 34-35).

Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990),

authorizes a peace officer to take these actions only when he has a
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is or has been involved
in criminal activity.
Third, Small provided his real name, address and an
explanation of his actions to Deputy Hudson.

Deputy Hudson

conducted a warrants check through his radio dispatcher because
Small did not have a driver's license in his possession, although he
did have a picture I.D.

(T: 14; 27). Through the warrants check

Deputy Hudson learned that warrants existed in Small7s name and
arrested him for them.

A warrants check is not authorized under

§77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990), and there is no record that Deputy
Hudson suspected Small was providing false information.

Utah courts

have ruled that detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Deitman, 739

P.2d at 617. The warrants check is a further act by Deputy Hudson
indicating that a constitutional seizure of Small occurred prior to
discovery of the warrants on which he was arrested.

As such, the

seizure must be justified under §77-7-15 by articulated facts that
create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small.
Utah courts have ruled that evidence discovered after a
stop cannot be used to justify the stop.
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State v. Baird# 763 P.2d

1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988).

Deputy Hudson testified at the

suppression hearing that he stopped Small because he considered him
"unusual".

(T: 32). He considered him unusual because of the late

hour, incidences of crime in the area the week prior, and because
Small exited the apartment complex on a walkway between two
entrances that Deputy Hudson considered unusual.

(T: 24; 32).

Deputy Hudson further testified that he did not think Small was
committing a crime (T: 32), that he did not know Small nor that
there were warrants for his arrest (T: 32), that Small was not
hiding (T: 32) and that Small did not attempt to run away or evade
him

(T: 33). These facts do not give rise to a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity by Small.
In State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Swanigan's Motion
to Suppress.

The court ruled that "reasonable suspicion" did not

exist where two men were walking in a residential neighborhood at
1:40 a.m. where a burglary had been reported earlier that evening.
The men matched a description of men seen in the same neighborhood
contemporaneously with the burglary report two hours earlier who had
"stared" at an officer as he drove by.

The officer conducted a

warrants check and searched the men upon discovery of an outstanding
warrant on Swanigan.

Evidence obtained pursuant to that search was

ruled inadmissible by the Supreme Court.
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the
Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of
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Trujillo's Motion to Suppress.

The court ruled that "reasonable

suspicion" did not exist where three men were walking at 3:40 a.m.
in a business district where there is a high crime rate and
Trujillo, upon seeing the police officer, abandoned a knapsack
behind a garbage can.
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Carpena7s Motion
to Suppress.

The court ruled that "reasonable suspicion" did not

exist where a slowly moving automobile with out-of-state plates
entered residential property at 3:00 a.m. in a neighborhood where a
number of burglaries had recently occurred.

All of these cases are

similar on their facts to the case at bar, and the court's rationale
that reasonable suspicion did not exist to justify the stops applies
with added force to the facts of the present case.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Deputy Hudson lacked
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small to justify the
stop and detention under §77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990).

Thus, the

stop was made in violation of Small's constitutional rights against
unreasonable seizure.

U. S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I,

§14.

POINT II
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY EXPLOITATION OF
AN IMPERMISSIBLE STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED
Small's identity was the initial evidence obtained against
him as a result of his admission to Deputy Hudson after the stop.
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Some time later, having been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car,
Small was identified at the scene by the complaining witness who had
seen a black man near the burglarized vehicle earlier in the
evening.

Following the identification by the complaining witness,

Small admitted the location of his car to deputies Hudson and
Fontaine.

Deputy Fontaine and the complaining witness located

Small's car based on Small's admission of its location, and Deputy
Fontaine confirmed its ownership based on Small's admission of his
own identity.

The car was then searched and property located inside

that was identified by the complaining witness as having been stolen.
Evidence derived from the illegal seizure of Small is not
admissible against him at trial.
719.

See, e.g., Swanigan# 699 P.2d at

The evidence against Small in the present case was obtained

pursuant to the illegal stop and, as such, should have been
suppressed by the trial court on Small's Motion to Suppress.

CONCLUSION
The initial stop of Small by Deputy Hudson was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity pursuant to
§77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990).

As such, it constitutes an illegal

seizure of Small. U. S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, §14.
All evidence derived from the unconstitutional seizure is
inadmissible in criminal proceedings against Small.
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For any or all of the foregoing reasons the appellant,
BRYAN K. SMALL, respectfully appeals to this Court to reverse the
trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress and order that the
charges in the present case be dismissed against him.
DATED this £-!<

day of October, 1990.

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT / J
Attorney for Defenaarrfy
Appellant

- 11 -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988)

7

State v. Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986)

9

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988)
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)
State v. Trujillo, 739 P. 2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)

6, 7
6
8, 10
6, 8

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (Supp. 1990)
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990)

1
5, 7, 9, 10

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
U.S. Const, amend. IV

5, 9, 10

Utah Const, art. I, §14

5, 9, 10

- 12 -

TEXTS OF STATUTES, FTJLES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — GroundsA peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.

JUDICIAL CODE

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resultingfromformal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appealsfromdistrict court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
G) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not beviolated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART. I, § 14

Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
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